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Abstract
Incident Reporting Systems (IRS) are and will continue to be an
important influence on improving patient safety. They can provide
valuable insights into how and why patients can be harmed at the
organizational level. However, they are not the panacea that many
believe them to be. They have several limitations that should be con-
sidered. Most of these limitations stem from inherent biases  of volun-
tary reporting systems. These limitations include: i) IRS can’t be used
to measure safety (error rates); ii) IRS can’t be used to compare
organizations; iii) IRS can’t be used to measure changes over time; iv)
IRS generate too many reports; v) IRS often don’t generate in-depth
analyses or result in strong interventions to reduce risk; vi) IRS are
associated with costs. IRS do offer significant value; their value is
found in the following: i) IRS can be used to identify local system haz-
ards; ii) IRS can be used to aggregate experiences for uncommon con-
ditions; iii) IRS can be used to share lessons within and across organ-
izations; iv) IRS can be used to increase patient safety culture. Moving
forward, several strategies are suggested to maximize their value: i)
make reporting easier; ii) make reporting meaningful to the reporter;
iii) make the measure of success system changes, rather than events
reported; iv) prioritize which events to report and investigate, report
and investigate them well; v) convene with diverse stakeholders to
enhance the value of IRS.
The promise
Incident Reporting Systems (IRS) are a cornerstone for improving
patient safety.1 All high-risk industries have them. While IRS are rela-
tively new in healthcare, similar systems in nuclear, railway, fire, and
aviation industry have had tremendous success.2 The concept behind
IRS is simple; they provide a mechanism to identify risks so that
organizations can implement interventions to reduce these risks. IRS
provide valuable information to identify hazards and surface learning
opportunities. In healthcare, IRS provide frontline caregivers a mech-
anism to raise concerns, providing voice to these clinicians that man-
agement can work to mitigate. 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) advocates for the development and
use of IRS. The IOM recommended the following. Recommendation
5.1: a nationwide mandatory reporting system should be established
that provides for the collection of standardized information by govern-
ments about adverse events that result in death or serious harm.
Recommendation 5.2: the development of voluntary reporting efforts
should be encouraged.1 The Joint Commission now requires that all
hospitals have and use IRS.
Because of this, there has been an explosion of adverse event
reporting systems in healthcare. Some reporting systems are national
(Australian Incident Management System, National Reporting
Learning System, etc.), some are local (Patient Safety Network,
Pennsylvania Safety Reporting System, etc.), some focus on a specific
area (Intensive Care Unit Reporting System) while others focus on a
specific type of event (Medmarx – medication), some are public while
others are private. The recent Patient Safety Act has tasked the gov-
ernment with creation of a national database for sharing of adverse
events, known as the National Patient Safety Database (NPSD). 
Yet to date, there is limited evidence to demonstrate that IRSs in
healthcare have lived up to their expectations for making care safer.
Progress in reducing preventable harm has been slow,3,4 and IRS have
not provided the insight or lead to improvements that many had hoped
for. In this article, we review some challenges that IRS have encoun-
tered, focusing on what IRS cannot do. We then discuss what they can
do and how they provide the most value. Finally, we offer some practi-
cal suggestions on moving forward. 
The challengeIncident Reporting Systems can’t be used to measuresafety (error rates)
IRS cannot be used to measure safety. There is growing interest
among policy makers, payers, hospital leaders and patients in measur-
ing how safe hospitals and health systems are. This includes: i) meas-
uring the rate of specific adverse events (for example, how often do
medication errors occur in our institution?); ii) holding
individuals/organizations accountable for safety problems (for exam-
ple, why are never events occurring at this institution?); iii) measuring
the overall safety profile of a hospital to make purchasing decisions
(for example, is this a safe hospital? Should I get my care here?).
In the absence of better sources of information, some turn to IRS to
answer these questions. However, IRS data are a non-random sample
Significance for public health
Incident Reporting Systems (IRS) are and will continue to be an important
influence on improving patient safety. However, they are not the panacea
that many believe them to be. They have several limitations that should be
considered when utilizing them or interpreting their output: i) IRS can’t be
used to measure safety (error rates); ii) IRS can’t be used to compare organ-
izations; iii) IRS can’t be used to measure changes over time; iv) IRS gener-
ate too many reports; v) IRS often don’t generate in-depth analyses or result
in strong interventions to reduce risk; vi) IRS are associated with costs.
Moving forward, several strategies are suggested to maximize their value: i)
make reporting easier; ii) make reporting meaningful to the reporter; iii)
make the measure of success system changes, rather than events reported;
iv) prioritize which events to report and investigate, do it well; v) convene










from the total universe of safety hazards. They are more suited for
identifying risks. For many reasons, IRS cannot be used to measure
safety. First, events are under-reported. Approximately 7% of all adverse
events are reported to IRS,5 and different methods of detecting errors
identify different types of events and results in different conclusions
about safety.6 Reasons for this include fear of retribution, shame, lack
of time, complexity of reporting system, lack of perceived value, report-
ing fatigue, etc.7 Moreover, there is variation (bias) on what types of
events are reported. For example, is a tear during vaginal delivery of a
baby an adverse event? While some say yes, others may argue that it is
a known and unavoidable consequence of vaginal delivery of large
babies. Even among reported events, there is variation in the threshold
in reporting. While some individuals may report near-misses, others
only report those event that result in patient harm. Some types of
adverse events are reported with high frequency (e.g. falls) while oth-
ers are often under-reported (e.g. medication adverse events). Finally,
some provider types report adverse events with regularity (e.g. nurses)
while others report events infrequently (physicians).8
In order to be a valid measure of the rate of adverse events, a meas-
ure requires three things. There should be a clear definition of the
event (numerator); few adverse event in healthcare are well defined.
There should be a clear definition of the population at risk (denomina-
tor); the population in healthcare are usually not defined. Finally, there
should be a consistent surveillance system for detection of both the
event and the population at risk. IRS have a problem with all three of
these. For example, medication adverse events might be measured in
terms of patients, patient days, or doses of medications administered;
IRS don’t measure any of these. Moreover IRS rely on the vigilance,
honesty, and whim of healthcare providers to detect and report adverse
events; this is a poor substitute for a surveillance system. The most
valid measures of patient safety are related to hospital acquired infec-
tions, such as central-line associated blood stream infections. For many
of these conditions, there are national definitions for numerators,
denominators, and hospitals have invested significant infrastructure
into active surveillance processes. Incidentally, this is the area with the
most demonstrated progress.9Incident Reporting Systems can’t be used to compareorganizations
IRS cannot be used to compare organizations. Healthcare leaders
and patients want a measure to compare patient safety among health
systems, hospitals, and healthcare providers. The underreporting and
bias in the system make comparisons nearly impossible. This is under-
scored by a statement from the National Coordinating Council for
Medication Error Reporting Systems (NCC-MERP) explicitly recom-
mending that data from these systems not be used to compare health-
care providers or their organizations.10 For example, Table 1 is a hypo-
thetical example of the number of medication error reported to a hos-
pital IRS. On initial inspection, it may seem that the oncology unit has
poor medication safety practices. What if the oncology unit sees four
times more patients or administers four times more medications per
patient than the other units? As it turns out, an investigation into these
numbers revealed that the oncology unit was more vigilant in its med-
ication safety practices because of its use of chemotherapeutic agents.
There were twice as many double checks as the other units (better safe-
ty culture). Near-misses uncovered by these double-checks were rou-
tinely reported to the IRS (better reporting culture). Blindly using the
IRS to compare these units would have misled us about their safety
practices.Incident Reporting Systems can’t be used to measurechanges over time
Valid error rates are required to make inferences about changes in
safety over time. For all of the reasons discussed above, IRS do not pro-
vide such information. Take the example of wrong-site surgeries. The
Veterans Affairs (VA) has developed a tool to reduce their risk, and in
2004 The Joint Commission required that hospitals implement a time
out, to prevent these events. Yet despite implementation of these inter-
ventions, the apparent rate of wrong-site surgeries from IRS continues
to climb (Figure 1). This increase is much more likely to be due to
increased reporting (reporting bias) from increased awareness rather
than an increase in wrong-site surgery from all these interventions.
This data urges caution in interpreting changes over time in reported
events, even highly visible events that are well-defined.Incident Reporting Systems generate too manyreports
Even for a medium-sized organization, an active error reporting cul-
ture can lead to many reports. For example, Johns Hopkins Hospital
(~1000 beds) generates approximately 500 reports per month. Many
organizations do not have the resources to read, much less analyse all
of these reports. This can lead to dissatisfaction from users when their
reports are left unresolved. In addition, reporting is sometimes used to
complain about a colleague’s performance or behaviour. It is not sur-
prising that many users feel dissatisfied with these systems.11
Moreover, some reports provide little incremental value about the
insight of safety systems. For example, patient fall reports tend to con-
tain the following similar narrative: nurse found patient on the ground
after the patient tried to get out of bed. Physician was notified. After
evaluation, no permanent harm was identified. Without further details
and/or action by those analysing team, these reports tend to have lim-
ited incremental value, questioning the benefit of having the user
report them in the first place.Incident Reporting Systems often don’t generate in-depth analyses or result in strong interventions toreduce risk
Because of the relatively limited resources, error investigations and
analysis in healthcare are often superficial. In many hospitals, the legal
department performs these analyses. Their staff often have limited to no
training in adverse event investigation or human factors. This is con-
trasted with other high-risk industries, where accidents are rare and
investigations are in-depth. For example, the United Airlines flight 1549
Hudson River crash resulted in a 16-month investigation, removal of the
plane from the bottom of the river, and DNA analysis of the Canadian
Geese that caused the engine failure. Examples such as this are rare in
healthcare. Moreover meaningful change occurs infrequently, with the
majority of changes being informing staff involved and education/train-
ing.12 This leads to recurrence of adverse events across the healthcare
industry, sometimes even within the same institution.13 The lack of
meaningful change can be due to a variety of reasons: production pres-
sures, small financial margins, limited regulatory authority, lack of stan-
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Table 1. Hypothetical example of number of adverse events
reported to a hospital Incident Reporting Systems. 
Clinical area Events/month
Emergency Department 25
General Internal Medicine 19
Oncology 112
Surgery 15
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dardization, professional culture, lack of institutional will, etc.3,14 The
lack of meaningful change, for whatever reason, diminishes the poten-
tial value of an adverse event reporting system. Some challenges are
national, leaving individual hospitals with only a limited ability to make
changes. For example, a medication error will likely occur somewhere in
the United States today involving an inadvertent hydromorphone for
morphine substitution. Yet the individual hospital has a limited ability to
fix the problem of two look-alike sound-alike drugs that have an 8X dif-
ference in potency. Instead, many hospitals resort to education and train-
ing of their staff, an intervention known to have limited ability to perma-
nently reduce risk. Incident Reporting Systems are associated with costs
IRS come with costs. The costs of building and implementation of these
systems are most visible. However, there are significant costs to training
staff on its use, actual reporting, collecting, and analysing the data from
these systems. These costs are often ignored, but can be significant. In
the fall example above, the costs of collecting additional informational
about fall events might be better spent on implementing best practices
(fall risk assessment, fall risk communication/signs, hourly rounds for
comfort, safety, pain, toileting, chair/bed/posey alarms, medication modi-
fication) to reduce patient falls.15 Moreover, when budgets are tight, it is
easy to cut funds for the analysis and change implementation from these
systems. Ironically, these are the steps that improve patient safety. On the
other side, the assumption is that IRS will lead to reduction of medical
errors. This in turn, would lead to reduction in patient harm, which would
lead to reduction in costs. While true in principle, this has been extreme-
ly difficult to quantify and demonstrate. As with most preventative efforts,
benefits are theoretical while costs are real. For example, hospitals are
compensated for the complexity and number of patients they treat, not the
number of errors they prevent. In some cases, having an adverse event
might lead to a higher profit margin.16
What can Incident Reporting Systems do
Given these challenges, what value, can an adverse event reporting
system offer? Should a hospital/healthcare system invest in one at all?Incident Reporting Systems can be used to identifylocal system hazards
Information provided in IRS are nuggets of gold from which we may
better identify hazards, understand the complex inner workings of our
healthcare system and design interventions to reduce risks to future
patients. For example, several years ago, a nurse at Johns Hopkins
Hospital reported that her patient was sent the incorrect medication
from pharmacy. Although the label was correct, she noticed that the pill
looked different than the metoprolol that she normally gave. As it turns
out, the pharmacy label-maker had received a software update and had
defaulted back to incorrect settings. Such a report, of a near-miss, like-
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ly prevented hundreds of medication errors. Currently, the most valu-
able lessons from these IRS occur from single cases. A variety of tools
that provide a systematic analytic framework can help clinicians learn
from these events.17Incident Reporting Systems can be used to aggregateexperiences for uncommon conditions
While the most valuable lessons from IRS occur from single cases,
the aggregation of uncommon cases can provide insight into failure
modes and risks. In the wrong-site surgery example above, aggregation
of 132 wrong-site surgical events in the state of Colorado revealed that
100% of the cases involved a communication failure and 72% did not
have a time-out performed.18 This required 6 years and data from 5937
physicians. A single institution would not have enough experience/
events to identify such patterns and potential vulnerabilities.
Therefore, the aggregation and analysis of uncommon cases from the
IRS across many organizations can be useful in this way.Incident Reporting Systems can be used to share lessons within and across organizations
The lessons learned from IRS can be used to educate, inform, and
prevent other organizations from experiencing the same adverse
events. Such a system for sharing can occur at a local, regional, nation-
al, or international level. For example, the Canadian Global Patient
Safety Alerts (GPSA) system is a repository of case details and lessons
learned from adverse events. Healthcare organizations can search the
system to identify adverse events, their known failure mechanisms,
and interventions that may be implemented to prevent their occur-
rence. This allows healthcare organizations to share the most valuable
aspect of IRS (lessons learned) without the burdens of incident inves-
tigation and confidentiality concerns. Given that the same adverse
events are occurring around the world, such sharing is sorely needed.Incident Reporting Systems can be used to increasepatient safety culture
The real implementation and use of a reporting system (the full
reporting cycle with: reporting, analysis, and implementation of system
changes in analogy to the Plan-Do-study-Act cycle of quality manage-
ment) within a healthcare institution communicates a lot about how
the organization views patient safety. The implementation and commu-
nication of such a system to staff members can be a method of chang-
ing patient safety culture. This effect is apart from the advantages of
the IRS itself. 
Moving forward
To enhance their value, we offer some practical suggestions in the
design and use of IRS.Make reporting easier
As opposed to making adverse event reporting systems more com-
plex, we should move to making reporting exceedingly easy and less
burdensome. Healthcare providers should have quick and ready access
(electronic, web-based) to these systems.19 These systems should be so
simple that staff can use them with minimal or without training.20
Given the infrequent nature by which most staff members report
adverse events, any training will likely have been forgotten at the time
of reporting. 
These systems should probably ask for a minimal amount of informa-
tion. Instead of asking the healthcare provider to categorize the event,
rate the event, and attribute causes, a free text description and some
identifying information might be all that is required. The deluge of
adverse event reports by healthcare providers has lead to many reports
that are incomplete,21 with some being inaccurate.11 A patient safety
officer familiar with adverse event reporting should further investigate
events that have merit. Such a system has been developed at the
University of Basel, Switzerland and has been adopted as the standard
in Germany.22Make reporting meaningful to the reporter
Healthcare providers do not report adverse events because much of
the time, identified problems are not remediated.23 Moreover, the
reporter rarely receives feedback about whether the event was read or
deemed important. From a communication science perspective, this is
problematic because communication has not taken place until the
receiver of a message has conveyed feedback to the sender to confirm
message receipt and validated the intended meaning of the message.
Thus, interpersonal communication is a simultaneous sense-making
process, and the extent to which participants share a common interpre-
tation of a given message determines the effectiveness of any given
interaction.24 In light of this literature, it is no surprise that when sur-
veyed, less than 39% felt that reporting adverse events represented
good use of staff time and resources.11 Instead, clinicians often devel-
op apathy towards reporting, especially in the setting of high produc-
tion pressures. 
The following communication concepts can help clarify how to make
incident reporting more meaningful to the reporter.
Empathy (i.e., one’s ability to understand another’s thoughts and
feelings) is a critical skill that contributes to competent communica-
tion.25 This particularly makes sense in the IRS context: IRS managers
should take the perspective of clinicians, understand why they are cur-
rently not reporting, and then adapt their communication strategies to
these reasons to facilitate increased reporting. 
Communication relies on multiple channels. Written communica-
tion is channel-lean and thus subject to a high likelihood of miscom-
munication (i.e., message being decoded inaccurately).25 In the con-
text of AERS, this risk goes both ways – the report of an adverse event
may be interpreted inaccurately by risk management, and the response
by risk management may be interpreted inaccurately by the reporting
medical professional. All behaviour (and non-behaviour) is communi-
cation; thus, no feedback in response to AERS communicates some-
thing (such as, for example, they don’t care to respond). 
Communication has literal meanings as well as relational implica-
tions.26 For example, communication in response to submitted incident
reports contains informational content (e.g., your report was received),
but it also contains relational content that, if done well, can convey
trust, investment, commitment, etc.; these relational contents define
the type of relationship we want to have with others. So conceptually,
relational message contents define the type of communication that
takes place in a given organization. Thus, relational communication
chronologically precedes the development of a safety culture, so it could
be even argued that it is communication culture which leads to safer
practice.
Based upon these communication concepts, the following strategies
are recommended:
The person who reports an event should receive timely feedback.8,20
Even if this feedback is only to thank the reporter and let them know
that the event is being investigated. This feedback validates under-
standing of the report and communicates that somebody is listening
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and cares about the event. Furthermore, a competent communication
response can influence reporters to feel that reporting is worth my time
and may increase future reporting. 
Managers should share reports with staff.27 This will not only educate
the staff of risks in their environment, but will also provide a forum to
solicit their ideas on how to further reduce risk and inform staff that
action is occurring as a result of their reporting efforts. Moreover, these
lessons should be shared at the local, regional, national, and interna-
tional levels. This may reduce the likelihood that events recur across
the healthcare industry. 
Leaders should devote institutional resources to not just collecting
the data, but analysing the events and mediating risk. In the end, this
is the ultimate value of the system. When staff observe that the institu-
tion is willing to change based upon their feedback, real changes in
safety culture start to occur.Make the measure of success system changes, ratherthan events reported
It is easy to become focused on gathering reports from an adverse
event reporting system. In the early stages of implementation, it is
important to educate, inform, and get staff to report events. This is an
important component of safety culture. However, the ultimate measure
of success of an IRS is not the number of reports received, rather the
amount of harm prevented as a result of the system. In many cases, this
might be difficult to measure. A reasonable alternative is measuring
the number of system changes made as a result of the IRS. Prioritize which events to report and investigate;report and investigate them well
Whereas the airline industry has fatal accidents as a solitary focus,
healthcare has no such focus. This lack of focus has caused the health-
care industry to fragment its efforts. As mentioned above, this has lead
to a deluge of adverse event reports with few in-depth analyses and
even fewer strong solutions. 
One alternative is to focus on reporting of a finite set of high-yield
events. Such a set of events might be based upon level of harm, pre-
ventability, or regional/national priority. An organization might focus
on events that occur most frequently (e.g., medication errors), lead to
the most harm (e.g., falls), or are of greatest concern to patients or pol-
icy makers (e.g., wrong-site surgery). The National Quality Forum
(NQF) has such a set of events, termed Serious Reportable Events
(SRE).28 Mandatory reporting of some form of SRE has been adopted by
over 11 states.29 This will serve to prioritize healthcare’s efforts and
might lead to a more meaningful IRS. Convene with diverse stakeholders to enhance thevalue of Incident Reporting Systems
Several countries have a national IRS (United Kingdom, Australia,
United States developing). These recommendations for local organiza-
tions may also apply to national systems. Moreover, those leading
national IRS should meet regularly with healthcare provider organiza-
tions and other stakeholders to improve use of IRS data to reduce pre-
ventable harm. For example, a national reporting system may partner
with device manufacturers or professional specialties to share common
events.
Conclusions
IRS are and will continue to be an important influence on improving
patient safety. They can provide valuable insights into how and why
patients can be harmed at the organizational level. However, they are
not the panacea that many believe them to be. They have several limi-
tations that should be considered when utilizing them or interpreting
their output. Moving forward, the suggested strategies may maximize
their value. 
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